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The1955SystemandAfter：Theimpactofthe   
lasttwoelectionsonJapanesepolitics  
SatomiTani   
An outstanding feature ofJapanese politicsis continued oneparty  
predomiance．Since1955，the LiberalDemocratic Party（LDP）hasnever  
beenoustedfrompower（l）．However，thistraditionofone－partypredomi－  
nanceabruptlycametothebrinkofcollapseinthesummerof1989，with  
theunpredictedrevivaloftheJapan Socialist Party（JSP）inthe Upper  
Houseelection．TheLDPfailedtosecureamaJOrityineitherHousefor  
thefirsttimesinceitsformationin1955．Itisstillarguablewhetherthis  
election was what V．0．Key cal1ed a”critical”election rather than a  




LDP succeededin obtaining more than50percent of the seats of the  
Lower Housein thelast generalelectionin February1990．It may be，  
therefore，thatnostructuralchangeinJapanesevotingbehaviorhasyet  
occurred．   








the LDPwon anexceptionallylargenumberofseats．Itwillbedifficult  
fortheLDPtowinsomanyagain．Atleastthroughthefirsthalfofthe  
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1990s，then，the LDPwillface adifficultsituationintheDiet．   
TheimpactofthelastUpper Houseelectionwasthereforenotat all  
ephemeral．Eachpartyhasbeengropingforanewstrategythatwillbe  
WOrkableinthisunfamiliarenvironment．Thus，Japanese partypolitics  
hasenteredintoaneraoftransition．Thisprocesshasnotreacheditsfinal  
Stageyet．Inthisreport，1wi11examinethisongoingchangeandtrytofind  
SOmepOSSibledirections．But forabetterunderstandingofthis change，  
We muSt anSWer a preCeding question：Whatis changing at all？In my  
view，thepresentsituationcanbeseenastheendoftheso－Called55－nen  






Were formed almost simultaneouslyin1955and herebyJapanese party  
COnfiguration became much simpler thanin the preceding period．The  
WOrd”taisei，”however，uSuallyconnotes”governingmode”，”organizing  
principle”，Or”regime”．InJapan，many peOPle have regarded the1955  




atthelevelof”metarule”ofa politicalgame．  
Inmyview，the1955system atthelattertwolevelslongsurvivedthe  
collapse of the system at the firstlevel．It was thelast Upper House  
election，alongwith the great changeinJapan’s positionin the world  
politicaleconomyandinternationalpoliticalsituation，thatbroughtthe  
1955systemtoitsendatalllevels．  
An overview of thelast two elections  
Asmentionedabove，theJSPscoredanunpredictedvictoryinthelast  
Upper House election．Of the50proportionalrepresentation seats，the  
JSPwon20，COmParedto15fortheLDP．TheJSPalsodefeatedtheLDP  
ニ，   




later anotherindependentjoinedup．TheJSP campthus took620f126  
SeatS，COmparedtoonly20inthepreviousUpperHouseelectionin1986．  
ThiswasthefirsttimetheJSPhadeverfinishedontopinanational－1evel  





to three seats．   
Themostcommonexplanationfortheresultofthelast Upper House  
election is to attribute the defeat of the LDP to a coincidence of two 
issues and one scandal．The mostimportant factor seemed to be a”  
right－Or－WrOng”issuewithregardtotheintroductionoftheconsumption  
tax．TheLDPgovernment’sintroductionofthenewtaxsystem，apparent・  
1y violatingltS earlier pledge，WaS Very unpOpular among voters．Even  
Small－Sizedretailers，mOStOfwhomhadbeendependablesupporters，Were  
inclinedto vote against the LDP，   
Thesecondissuewastheliftingofprotection over agrlCulturalprod－  
ucts，eSpeCiallytheimpendingquestionofwhethertoopenthedoortothe  
riceimports．Asis wellknown，the retailprice of riceinJapanis  





nationtoresist American pressure appearedtowaver，andseveralLDP  
leadersmentioned，eVenthoughnotformally，thepossibilityofriceimport  
liberalization．Farmers’distrustoftheLDP’sagrlCulturalpolicyrapidly  
greW・   
The scandalwas the Recruit money－for－favors affair，WhichinvoIved  
quite a few LDP politicians．Incidents of corruption are not rarein  
Japanesepolitics，andtheyseldominfluenceelectionseriously，although  
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One OfthetoplSSueSintheelection．   
The coincidence of these three serious issues no doubt contributed to 
the remarkable result of the Upper House election．The size of this  
upheavaldemands reconsideratioIlOf the traditionalwisdom that  
Japanese voters are not much affected byissues．For example，aS has  
Oftenbeenpointed out，thevoteshareoftheLDPshrankalmostlinearly  
fromthelate1950stothe early1970s，Withlittle apparentimpact from  
any grand controversies among the politicalparties．Even the LDP  
government’ssuccessfuleconomicpolicieswhichbroughtsuchhigh・Speed  
growth，failedtoreverseormbdifythisdeclineclearly．   
Long－term factors such as mobilization through socialnetworks and  
established partyloyalty outweighed such short－term factors asissues  
andpartyleaders’imagesinshapingthepoliticalattitudesofmostvoters．  









last Upper House election．Thispattern withinthe opposition persisted  
throughthe1990generalelection，although of course the LDP did far  
better then．   
Thatis，the1989election had plunged the LDPinto a predicament．  
PrimeMinisterUnoresigned andallthepotentialsuccessorswereforced  
togive up power．Instead，Kaifu，Who had never been amo11g the top  
influentials of the LDP，WaSllOminated as the premier．Many people  
expectedanearlydissolutionoftheLowerfIouse］eadingtotheendofthe  
LDP’s one－party rule．Resisting pressure for a quick election，Prime  
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Minister Kaifu waited for a change ofwind，and finally dissoIved the  
LowerHouselateinJanuary1990．Hisstrategyprovedtobesurprisingly  
SuCCeSSful：the LDP won more than280seats to secure a majority not  
Onlyinthefullhousebut alsoinallstandingcommittees．   
ExceptfortheJSP，theoppositionpartiesfoundthemselvesinagl00my  
situation after the election．TheJapan Communist Party（JCP）and the  
Democratic Socialist Party（DSP）almost halved the number of their  
SeatS，aStheyhadinthelast Upper Houseelection．Sincethen，theDSP  
hasbeenstrugglingjusttosurvive．TheJCPalsofacedseriousproblems  
Ofimage，due to thecollapse ofcommunismin Eastern Europe andthe  
SovietUnion．ThesetbacktotheCleanGovernmentParty（CGP）wasnot  
assevere．butitselectoralfutureisin doubtbecausethepartyisbased  
almost exclusively on a Buddhist sect which haslong since stopped  
growing．Thenumber oftheJSP’sseats，On the contrary，increasedby  
more than50，allowing the party to sur・paSS allthe other opposition  





thedisappearanceoftheshortLtermeffect oftheissuecoincidence（4）．   
The first pointis that candidates for the Lower House arein closer  
COntaCtwithlocalsocialnetworksandcommunity organizations，Which  
ar・euSuallyconservative，becausetheirelectoraldistrictsaresmallerthan  
those for the Upper House．Conservative Lower House candidates can  




Resentment againstcorruptiondidnotlastlong，and votersgot usedto  
thenewconsumptiontax．Someretailerswhohadopposedtheconsump－  
tiontaxactuallyfounditprofitabletothem，andreturnedtotheconserva－  
tivecamp．   
An often overlooked aspect of the1990generalelection，however，is  
thattheJSPalsoeIljoyedgoodfortune．Infact，itwastheonlyoneparty  
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toincreasethe number ofits seats．Theincrease was more than5O，a  
greatadvanceconsideringtheJSP’sshabbyperformancesince1969，When  
itlostmorethan40seatsatonetime．Inthe1970sandmostofthe1980s，  
theJSP barely keptits head above waterin the competition with the  
Otheroppositionparties，butitsimportanceinJapanesepoliticswasoften  
questioned．As theresultofthelasttwoelections，theJSPhasregained  
asubstantialleadwithintheopposition．   
Why these successive victories forthe socialists？Nearly allanalysts  
StreSSthepopularityofDoiTakako，thechairpersonoftheJSP．Intheera  
Ofmasssocietyandmassmedia，theimageorappealofapartyleaderis  
apt to affect voters’decisions evenin countrieswith parliamentary  
election systems．EveninJapan，reCently，the popularity of Prime  
Minister Nakasone had been one ofthe major factorsin thelandslide  
victory of the LDPin the1986”double”election．Doitoois such an  
attractiveleader tovotersin amasssociety．   
Butitissomewhatdangeroustoattributetheentirevictorytoasingle  
person，eVenifheorsheisveryattractiveinvoters’eyes．Nakasone，for  
example，SuCCeededin appealingto votersthroughhis decisiveness and  
prominent diplomatic style，and broughtvictory to the LDPin1986．  
However，he failed to gaina safe majorityin the1983Lower House  
election．Notonlytheleader’simage，butthatofthepartyitselfcanaffect  
VOting behavior．In1989－90，the difference of credibilityin the eyes of  
VOterS’among the opposition parties may have been the key．Perhaps  
Japanesevoters chose theJSP assecond best to the LDP，aSthemost  
reliableoppositionparty，ifnottherulingone．  
In any case，tOday’sJapan has one weakened but stillpredominant  






some keychar’aCteristics ofthe1955system．  
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Threeaspectsofthe1955system  
In1955，tWO major parties were formed almost simultaneously，eaCh  
unifyingformerlycentrifugalforces．OnewastheLDP，andtheotherwas  
theJSP，No significantlylarge parties wereleft．Because this party  
COnfiguration presented a sharp contrast to the earlier situation，party  
POliticswithtwopartiesasthemain■actorshassincebeenreferredtoas  
the”1955system．”   
Thesignificanceofthe”1955system”is，however．notIleCeSSarilyclear．  
Thecommonestinterpretationpointstothequasi－tWO－Party SyStem for－  
medin1955，aCCOmpaniedby hopefor realizing an authentic two－party  
SyStem，COmpletewithalternationofthegovern1ngparty．Thisinterpreta－  
tiorlis abit superficial，butusefulinstressingtherelativestabilityand  
Simplicityofpost－1955partypolitics．Needlesstosay，inthe1955system，  
the LDP was always a predominant ruling party and the JSP was a 
perennialoppositionparty．Somepeople．therefore，arguedthatthe1955  
SyStemisin fact the”one－and－a，half party system．”The present party  
COnfigurationissimilartothisearly1955system．   
The195■5system as a party configuration did notlastlong．First，  
endemicintrapartystrugglesintheJSPcausedthesecessionofitsright  




Third，theJCPbegantorecoverstrengthinthesameperiod．   
Theappearanceofthesesmalleroppositionpartiesinnationalpolitics  
CraCked the1955system as a party configuration，but did not breakit  
downquickly．TheLDPandtheJSPsti11retainedmuchofthepowerthey  
heldinthelate1950s．The firststeplnthe collapse of the1955system  
Camewiththe1969generalelection，WhentheJSPlost51seatsovernight，  
andtheCGPandtheJCPadvaIICed．TheLDPwasalsolosingseats：for  
example，Sixin the1974 Upper House election．The result was the  
”Hakuchu”erainwhichthestreIlgthofthegoverningpartyandthatof  
the opposition as a whole came very close to each other．This trend  
COntinuedinthe1976generalelection，WhentheLDPlostitsmajorityin  
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SOme Lower Housestandingcommittees．   
The1955systemasapartyconfigurationthusendedinthefirsthalfof  
the1970s．Changesineconomicstructure，SOCiety，andculturehadturned  
theLDP－JSP－1eadingpartysystemintoa kindofmulti－party SyStem．In  
Spite ofthis shift，many peOPle foundit difficult to answer whether or  
Whenthe1955systemhadactua11yended．Forexample，the1979annual  
reportoftheJapanPoliticalScienceAssociationwasdevotedtoadebate  
abouttheformationandthecollapse ofthe1955system，butwecannot  
SeeanyagreementaStOtheendofthesystemamongthecontributors（5）．  
Thiscontroversycontinuedeveninthe1980s．Thissuggeststheexistence  
Ofanotheraspect ofthe1955systeminabroadsense．  
ln fact，the1955system has often been called theji－Sha shudo  
meanlng”politics almost exclusively determined by the LDP and the  
JSP，”or ji－Sha nareaitaisei，”politicsin which the LDP and theJSP  
accommodateeach otherbehindthescenes．”In these phrases，the1955  
SyStemisseenintermsofmanagementofthelegislativeprocess，bothin  
plenary session andin committees．Thatis，itisargued that theparliaT  
mentaryprocessisessentiallyunderthecontroloftheLDPandtheJSP，  
producingwhatIwaicalls”the1955systeminthe Diet”（6）   
One might think that this characterization of the1955system at the  
parliamentaryleve＝s nonsensical，glVen thecontinulngmajorlty Ofthe  
LDP．Aslongas majority ruleworks，OppOSition partieswouldseemto  




process（7）．Various procedures，preCedents，and norms canconstrainthe  
realizationoftherulingparty’sorgovernment’sintentions．AsMochizuki  
argues，theviscosityoftheJapaneseDietis quite powerful，SO thatthe  
OpPOSition can ofteninfluence thelegislative processin some way or  
another（8）．   
The JSP benefited from this viscosity much more than the other 
OPpOSitonparties．Arecentcasewel＝11ustratesthispolnt．Intheextraor－  
dinary Diet sessionin the summer of1989，theJSP decided to boycott  
deliberationsintheLowerrIousebudgetcommittee．themostimportant  
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Standingcommittee，tOpreSSurethegovernmenttotakefullresponsibility  
fortheRecruitscandal．Suchtacticshad oftenled tovariousbenefitsfor  
theJSP．In this case，however，the LDP decided toignore theJSP’s  
absence．SomeLDPinfluentialspTOudlytalkedabouttheirdetermination  
to deprive theJSP of any veto powerin the Diet．Only one daylater，  
however，the LDP returned toits old Diet management practice of  
accommodationtotheJSP．Apparentlyit feltcuriouslyuneasywiththe  




itsoverwhelmingperformanceinmostelections？This questionmustbe  
answered．   
Tomakealongstoryshort，thereweretwomainreasons．First，inthe  
early years of the1955system，theJSP had a substantialcapacity to  
mobilizemassmovementsinordertopressurethegovernmcnt．Theparty  
itselfthought high1y of”outside－the－Diet struggle．”Moreover，the LDP  
lackedthecohesivenesstorepelsuchpressuresfrom theJSP．On occaL  




pointsto theJSP．   
Second，inspiteofmanyseriousdisputesbetweentheLDPandtheJSP，  
manypoliticians onbothsidesshared a belicfin parliamentary democ－  
racy，andidealizedthe Britishmodelofa two－partySyStem．As Robert  
Dahlhasargued，beliefinthelegitimacyofdemocracyamonginfluentials  
is veryimportantin the development and stabilization of democratic  
politics（9）．Moreover，pOliticians ofboth parties began toidentify them－  
Selvesasbelongingtothesamegroupof”gikai－jin”（Dietpersons）through  
intensive face－tO－face contactsinlegislative committees and frequent  
interpartynegotiationsatvariouslevels．Face－tO－facerelationshipsoften  
raisemutualtrust，eSpeCiallyinJapan，andsopersonalfriendshipsdevel－  
Oped between the two camps．Althoughthere rcmained some stubborn  
anti－LDP or anti－JSP politicians，there was also a kind of cornmunity  
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COnSistingofmanyLDPandJSPpoliticians．Sometimes，pOliticiansfrom  
bothpartiescooperatedtorealizeacommoninterest，SuChasthecreation  




in1958was a good example of the accommodation between the two  
partiesinthosedays．Inthiscase，theyagreedtorestrictextensionsofthe  
Dietsession，WhichhadtheresultofincreaslngtheDiet’sviscosityeven  










OppOSition as a result（1‖．TheJSP too was forced tolisten to other  
OPpOSitionparties，Eveninthesedays．however，the LDPrJSP”commu－  
nity”continuedtoexist，bringlngCOmplaintsfromsmallerpartiesabout  
theLDP’s makingtoomuch oftheJSP．   
Thefinalaspect ofthe1955system whichweshouldexaminecanbe  
ca11ed”metarules，”mainlythe constitution and secondary the electoral  
SyStem（1Z）．Inthelate1950s，therightwingpoliticianswhodominatedthe  
conservative camp had tried hard to revise the new constitution  
introducedtoJapanbytheAmericanoccupation．Theirgoalwasmassive  
rearmament andincreasingrestrictions on people’srights and freedom．  
Some even envisaged a return to the prewar regime．If they had been  
successful，Japanesepostwarpoliticswouldhavebeenverydifferent．  
ItwastheJSPalongwithanti－rightistforcesintheLDPthatprevented  
the metarules established by GHQ from beingchanged too much．First，  
theJSPfrustratedtherightwing’sintentionsbysecuringenoughseatsin  
the Lower House to preventinitiation of a constitutionalamendment．  
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Then，When Prime Minister Hatoyama tried to deprive theJSP ofmost  
Ofits seats through modifyingthe electoralsystem，1iberalsinthe LDP  
implicitlyassistedthesocialistsintheirstruggleforsurvivalandfrustrat－  
edthepremier’sambition．Sucha debc［u alliancebetweenliberalsand  
SOCialists reappeared severalmore tinleS tO frustrate the right wing’s  
wishes．After1960，themainstreamoftheLDPabandoneditsattemptto  
revisetheconstitutionandmassivelyrearmament，1eavingtherightistsas  
aminorgroupwithinthe party．  









leadershir）return tO the old platform’s commitmeIlt tO COnStitutional  
revision．These calls natura11y brought an overreaction by theJSP，  
However，unlikethe1950stheseweremereskirmishesorevenritualsof  
COnflictthanrealbattlesthatthreatenedthesystemseriously．   
Aftcr1960，thereweresporadicchallengesagainstthe1955system as  
metarule，the electoralsystem as wellas thc constitutioll．I111973，for  
example，PrimeMinisterTanakaattemptedtointroducethesingle－Seat－  
districtsysteminto Lower Houseelections，but he was not evenable to  
introducethebilltotheUiet．PrimeMinisterNakasoneprovidesanother  
example．HehadbeenahardLlinerintheLDP，advocatingrevisionofthe  
constitution alld the strenRthel7ing of Japanese armed forces for many 
years．Buthechangedhismind and adopted a moreliberalstallCeafter  
becoming Premier．Such examples wellshow thelongevity of the1955  
SyStCm aSa pOliticalfr’ameWOrk ormetarule．  
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The1955systemandthe post－1989situation  
Both at thelegislative－prOCeSS】eveland at the metarulelevel，1955  
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SyStembasicallyretaineditsshape，longafterthepartyconfigurationof  
1955had been altered．Thisis not only because the constitution had  
remained unamended．As Theodore Lowisays，the politicalsystem or  
politicalregimecanchangesubstantial】yeveniftheconstitutionremains  
thesame（13）．InJapan．themainpo】iticalforceshadstakesinmaintaining  
an accommodative relationship，and they continued to believein the  
legitimacyordesirabilityofthepoliticalmetarule．Inertiacontributedas  
well．At the end ofthe first section ofthispaper，Iasked whether，aS a  
resultofthelasttwomajorelections，Japanesepoliticshadreturnedtoits  
Starting point after alongjourney．Now that main aspects ofthe1955  
SyStem havebeenbriefly analyzed，this question must be replaced by a  
newone：Didthelasttwoelectionsbringanysignificantchangestothe  
1955system，ateaChlevel？   
First，looking at party configuration may stillglVe uS SOme uSeful  
SuggeStions，Sinceitwasthemajortransformationinpartyconfiguration  
Whichsignifiedthestartingpointofthe1955system．Thecombinedshare  
Ofseatsofthe LDPandtheJSPwasmovedback towardthatofthelate  
1950s，COmparedwithtenyearsago．Thetwopartiesshared99percentof  
theLowerHouseseatsinthelate1950s，72percentin1981，and84percent  
at present．ThisseemstomeanthatJapanesepartyconfigurationretur－  
nedjust halfwayback toa prototypical1955system situation．Hasthis  
halfreturnstrengthenedthedistinctiveLDPJSP’’community”intheDiet  
again？Doesit areconfirmation ofthepreviousmetarule？   
Before answerlng these questions，We have to remember the other  
feature ofthe1955system atthe partyconfigurationlevel．Thatisthe  
SimplefactthatinthissystemtheLDPalwayssecuredamajorityinboth  
houses．The LDP often suffered from severeintra－party Struggles over  
metarule－relatedissues，butit was more cohesive over more practical  
issues．Withtheirperpetualmajority，theLDPandthegovernmentwere  
abletoacomplishmostofwhatthe）Tregardedasimportanttothem．As  
the result of thelast Upper House election，however，the LDPlost this  
Satisfactoryposition．Granted，the LDP－gOVernmentCangetbudgetbi11s  
passedwithoutthesupportofanyoppositionparty．Butalmostallbudget  
billsinvoIve revisions ofexistinglaws or theintroduction of newlaws，  
WhichisimpossiblewithoutsecuringamajorityintheUpperHouse．The  
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half－Way return OfJapanese partyconfigurationtoits earlyphasethus  
didincorporateanimportant differenceinitscontents．   
Whatwi】lthis twisted situation at thc configurationlevelbring to  
Japanesepoliticsinthenearfuture？WithintheDiet、WeCanSeeSeVeral  
interesting developments．A short－1ived attemptin1989to ally allthe  
OppOSitionpartiesexceptfortheJCPwasone．Mostinterestingisthefact  
that，inspiteofnoISyquarrelsovertheconsumptiontaxissue，mOStOfthe  
billspresented by the government easilypassed the Upper House．The  
governmentandtheoppositionbegantoaccommodatetoeachothersoon  
after the Uppcr House e］ection，1eaving one symbolicissue，the newly  
implemented consumption tax，tO be fought sharply but superficially  
between the two camps．The government quickly came to take the  
interests of the opposition partiesinto account as much as possible，in  
Order to soften their resistanccin the Upper House．For example，the  
governmentandtheLDPhadlongopposedthelktdi如l脚n ho（thelaw  
grantingemployeespaidleaveforinfantcare），Whichtheoppositionhad  





hadbeenpreventedtopasstheDietbytheLDP（14）・   
Ontheotherhand．the opposition7sattitudetoward bills presentedby  
thegovernment，eSpeCiallythatoftheJSP，alsobecamepositive．Forone  
thing，because opposition to a billcould paralyze the functionlng Of  
government，theJSP andotherpartieswerecautious・Foranother，thcy  
Wantedtoimpressvotersasresponsibleandrealisticparties．Thus，inthe  
l16thsession（from Octoberto December1989），78percent ofthebills  
presented by the government were passed．ⅠIlthel18th session（from  
FebruarytoJune1990），thepercentageroseto95（15）．   
Ofcourse，mutualconcessionsduringthelegislativeprocesshadbeen  
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Wentbeyond mutualconcessionstoengageinsubstaIltialcooperationin  
policyformation．PrimeMinisterKaifuevenmentioIledthedesirabilityof  
COnSultationbetweenthegovernmentandtheoppositionoverimportant  




to be a”minimum winning coalition．”Thatis，tO aCCOmmOdate the  
OppOSition as a whole would cost the LDP too much．Thus，itisnatural  
fortheLDP tolook for a morerestrictedandefficientformofcoopera－  
tion．   
OnepossibilitywouldbetostrengthentheoldLDP－JSP”community，”  
making the relationship between the two parties more equal．The two  
partiesdidtrycollaborationaftertheUpperHouseelection．Thenegotia－  
tionsbetweenJapan and NorthKoreatoestablishdiplomatic relations，  
whichstartedlastfall，WaSagOOdexample．Theaccumulationofcooper－  
ativepracticeintheDietmadethetwopartiesfeelcomfortablewitheach  
Other．AIso，the more pragmatic attitude of theJSP toward the  
government’spolicypropositionslookedtopromotefurthercooperation  
between the two．The action program approved by theJSP’s central  
executive cornmitteein March，1990，pOinted out theimportance of  
COnferlngWiththeLDPovervarioussubjects．  
If this cooperative relation between the two parties became more  






much chance of success．  
Intheevent，thingsdidnotgothatfar．TheCGPandtheDSPresented  
theJSP’sseemingto overshadowthem，andbegantoemphasizediffern－  
cesbetweenthemandtheJSP．TheyknewthatthedefeatoftheLDPin  
the Upper House election hadgiven them opportunities to makedeals．  
SomeinfluentialLDP politicjanssawthesituationthesameway．Thus，  
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thepossibilityanddesirabilityofaLDP－CGP－DSPcoalitionbegantobe  
considered．Butit was the Gulf crisis that made this schemelooklTlOre  
feasible，thoughat the same time this crisis brought the oldliberal－  
SOCialistimplicit alliallCetOthefore．   




for sending forces abroad．These right－Wingers succeededin getting  
PrimeMinisterKaifutointroducethenecessarylegislation，Whichcaused  
greatcontroversynotonlyamongtheoppositionpartiesbutalsowithin  
the LDPitself．The billfina11v died，partly becauseit proved to be a  
makeshift，fullofdefects，andpartlybecausetheliberaトsocialistirnplicit  




group which has given priority to maintain the relationship with the 
United States，relying on the postwar constitution and theJapanrUS  
SeCuritytreaty．Withinthislimit，theywouldnotbereluctanttosupport  
the United States，After the Upper House election，theJSPitself had  
Startedtomovetowardthisposition，buttheGulfcrisispushedtheparty  
back toits”idealistic”anti－War Campaign．This meant that theJSP no  
longerhadanyinterestintalkingwiththeLDPaboutpracticalsubjects．  
Thenewliberal－SOCialistalliancehadpruventobeatemporaryphenome－  
non．After thebillto dispatch defenseforces abroad wasabandonedby  
thegovernment，theJSPbecameisolatedintheDiet．InsteadoftheJSP，  
theCGPandtheDSPbegantogetmostattentionaspartnersoftheLDP．   
Actually，these three parties have along history of coalitions at the  
locallevel．Around1970，Japaneselocalpolitics had seen a surge of  
SOTCa11ed progressivelocalgovernments，mOSt Of which were based on  
COalitionsofcitizenmovementsandsomepartiesthatwereintheopposi－  
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end．In1976，theCGPdecidedtoswitchitsmaincoalitionpartneratthe  
locallevelfrom theJSP to the LDP and DSP．After that，COalitions  
COnSistingof these three partiessuccessfu11y took powerin manylocal  
governments，TheLDP’sattempttoluretheCGPandtheDSPattheDiet  
levelwasboIsteredbythoseexperiences．   
Here，What counts mostis the attitude of the CGP．The DSP had  
decidedtotaketheLDPsideasearlyasDecember，1989，butitisabittoo  
SmalltogivetheLDPamajorityintheUpperHouse．IftheCGPwereto  
SidewiththeLDPexplicitly，the1955systemat theDietlevelaswellas  
attheparty configurationlevelwillbe finished at that point．Japanese  
partypoliticswi11enteranewera，inwhichtheLDPandthemiddle－Of－  




COalitionisnolongeravailable．   
Atthismoment，itisabittooearlytopredictwhethertheCGPwi11join  
the conservative camp decisively or not．Allying with the LDP might  
implngeOnitsvaguelypacifiststanceasaBuddhistparty，Moreover，the  
Party has not a few activists who are very sensitive争boutJapanese  
mi1itary power．The second demand by the American government just  
afterthebegiIlningoftheGulfWar，thatJapanshouldsupporttheeffort  
Substantially，andthentheLDP－gOVernment’squickdecisiontocontribute  
an additiona19billion dollars and to dispatch air force planes caused  
Serious problems for the CGP．Itis certain，however，that the CGP’s  
preseIltleadershipiseagertoobtainsomepostsinthecabinet，Infact，the  
CGP finally decided to support the LDP’s promise to grant9billion  
dollars to America．   
Whetheritis the transformation of the LDP－JSP”community”or a  
LDP－CGP－DSPcoalitionthatleadsJapaneseparty politicsin the1990s，  
thedefeatoftheLDPseemstobefinishingoffthe1955systemattheDiet  
level．How about at the metarulelevel？   
Theessenceofthe1955systematthemetarulelevelisthejuxtaposition  
OfthepostwarconstitutionandtheJapan－USsecuritytreaty．Underthis  
regime，Japan had concentratedits energy on economic development  
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to do nothing politically beyond passively reacting to cnvironmental  
Change．The LDP’s defeatin the Upper House election coincidentally  
Camejust atthisdifficulttime．It seemsunlikelythatthe resultsofthe  
lasttwoelectionswillleadtoagreatmodificationofthe1955systemat  
themetarulelevelinthenearfuture，Thesuccessfulresistanceagainstthe  
revision of the Defense ForcesLawlast fallwellcorroborates thisinfer・－  
ence．Butoneimplicationofthe1955system atthemetarulcIcvelisthat  




moneyin their constituencies．Thus，after the election，reVision of the  
electoralsystemreturnedtotheagenda．Theelectoralsystcmcanbeseen  
asametaru1eofthepoliticalgame，andchangingitwould amounttoa  
transformationofthepoliticalframework．Ofcourse，Changingtheelec－  
toralsystem would have differntirnplications for each party．The LDP  
insistsontheintroductionofasingle－Seatdistrictsystem，butthissystem  
WOuldseriouslyhurt the opposition parties，eSpeCially the smaller ones▲  
Moreover，mOStindividualLDP Diet members arc very nervous abouL  
even a slight modification of their constituencies．Judging from the  
reluctance of allthe parties over thisissue，itwi11be very difficult to  
CarryOutanySubstantialreformofthepresentcIcctoralsystemwithina  
fewyears．Still，itisimportantthatsincetheUpperHouseelection，allthe  
partieshaveagreed atleast onthenecessltyOfa drastic change of the  
electoralsystem，eVenif agreement on what to do were a distallt prOS－  
pect．  
Concluding remark   
The1955system gotitsnamesimply because two major parties，the  
LDP and theJSP，Were foundedin1955．But someimportant features  
engendered by the birth ofthe1955systemlong survivcd major transir  
tionsinpartyconfiguration，andcontinued to affectJapanesepolitics．I  
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donotmeantosaythatthesefeaturesdefinedalltheimportantpolitical  
events and decisions．In order to explainJapanese politics．the roles  
playedbythebureaucracyandtheLDPfactions，anticipatedreactionsto  
COmlngelections，andmany other factors must alsobe analyzed，   
Nevertheless，itcanbearguedthatthelonglifeofthe1955system as  
aframeworkormetarulehelpedmakeJapanesepoliticsquitestable，and  
set reasonablelimits on most ofthebehavior of theimportant political  
actors．The1955system at theDietlevelcanalsobeseenasstabilizing  
Japanese politics，by ritualizing the fierce’’battles”between the two  
CamPS．Thissystemunderwentsomemodificationintheperiodofnearly  
even power but the LDP，JSP’’community”continued to structure the  
leglSlativeprocessuntiltheUpper Houseelection．  
In myview，the1989UpperIIouse e】ectionwas the first event which  
nlightleadtotheendofthe1955system．Butitalsoopenedadoor，ifonly  
Slightly，tO develop the1955systeminto a true two－party SyStem．At  
present，WeCanSeeSOmeCOntradictorytrendscoexisting，Inanycase，it  
isalmostcertainthattheoppositionpartieswi17continueto outnumber  
theLDPintheUpper Houseforseveralmoreyears．Thissituationmay  
encouragetheformationof a newsystem．Whateverthat maybe，how－  
ever，thenewsystemwillbeheavilyovershadowedbythe1955system．  
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